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BACKGROUND 
Post-colonial Rwanda was born out of a decisive reversal of power from the minority 
Tutsi to the majority Hutu occasioned by the 1959 revolution. The revolution inaugurated an era 
of massive movement of refugees in the region, endemic communal violence, and political 
frailty.  In the early 1980s, the government of Juvenal Habyarimana and the one-party state he 
had erected since 1973, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement 
Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, MRND), was under siege from three fronts.  
First, as the Habyarimana government grew more authoritarian, the intra-Hutu common political 
front frayed, shifting military and economic power to the president’s narrow northern ruling 
elites.  
Second, inequitable access to resources heightened intra-Hutu cleavages amidst a 
worsening economy. With the highest population density in mainland Africa (256 persons per 
square kilometer), Rwanda typifies the dilemma of overpopulation and resource scarcity 
compounded by severe dependence on coffee production.   By the second half of the 1980s, with 
economic growth rates falling behind a burgeoning population, the government admitted that it 
could only feed five million people.  Internal and external economic shocks were to worsen the 
class and regional polarization, contributing to the general weakening of the Habyarimana state.  
 Economic decline and external pressure for democratization galvanized domestic opposition 
groups to demand political reforms.  In response, Habyarimana appointed a commission in 
September 1990 to work out a National Political Charter that would allow the establishment of 
different political parties.1 
Third, against the backdrop of economic and political weakness, Tutsi exiles in Uganda 
organized in the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded in October 1990. Caught in an 
uncertain exile, RPF units that had been part of Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA) took 
the initiative, at the opportune instance of regime weakness, to force the issue of return, 
restoration of citizenship rights, national unity, and an end to a dictatorial system that generates 
refugees.  
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The Internationalization of the Conflict 
  
Between the RPF’s invasion in October 1990 and the signing of the Arusha Agreement in 
August 1993, the conflict went through two significant stages that form the background to UN 
intervention: external military intervention to support the belligerents; and regional mediation 
efforts to end the conflict.  Regional mediation had two primary phases: November 1990-May 
1992; and June 1992-August 1993.  These phases are important to analyses of the dynamics of 
the conflict and international efforts to address it.  
  
A. Foreign Military Intervention  
The fledgling Habyarimana government invited foreign military support in the fall of 
1990 support from its allies, Belgium, France, and Zaire to meet the RPF’s threat.  Responding to 
this appeal, Belgium sent 535 troops and France sent 300 troops ostensibly to protect their 
nationals in Rwanda.   Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko dispatched about 1, 000 troops that were 
deployed in direct combat against the RPF.  External support enabled the Rwandese army to 
inflict heavy casualties on the RPF.  But as the war raged on, however, Zaire and Belgium 
withdrew their troops, the latter citing a legal obligation to remain neutral in war situations, 
while Mobutu’s undisciplined troops left in ignominy.  After the withdrawal of Zairian and 
Belgian troops, France was left as the principal supporter of the government.  French military 
commitment to the government included the provision of troops and military advisers, the supply 
of heavy weaponry such as armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, communications 
equipment, and helicopters.  France also provided financial guarantees for purchases of small 
arms, mortars, and grenade launchers from Egypt and South Africa. Military assistance and 
training enabled Habyarimana to boost the government army, Forces Armees Rwandaises 
(FAR), which grew from 5,200 in October 1990 to 15,000 by mid-1991, and 30,000 by the time 
the Arusha negotiations began in June 1992.2 
Uganda’s military and political support for the RPF was indispensable to its initial 
survival.  Stemming from the RPF’s long-term alliance with Ugandan President Yoweri 
Museveni’s NRA, Uganda provided arms, food, and gasoline, and willingly opened its southern 
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border as a military launching pad and place of refuge.  In the face of widespread condemnation 
for the invasion, Museveni remained a dependable RPF ally in regional and international 
diplomatic circles.  
B. REGIONAL MEDIATION 
  
Phase One, 1990-1992 
  
  
The first phase of regional mediation efforts stemmed from Habyarimana’s desire to 
isolate the RPF and Uganda.  In a predictable spate of self-denial, this strategy entailed 
mobilizing the support first, of Belgium and its European allies to use their economic muscle on 
regional actors, and second, to enlist Tanzania and Zaire as mediators between Rwanda and 
Uganda.  Three weeks after the invasion, Belgium sent its Prime Minister, Wilfried Martens, to 
East Africa to persuade regional leaders to prevail on Museveni.  Martens proposed the creation 
of a regional intervention force to supervise a cease-fire, with Europe furnishing logistical and 
financial support.  Belgian diplomatic intervention led to regional consultations in November 
1990 focusing on a cease-fire and possible establishment of a peacekeeping force.   
Efforts to use Tanzania’s influence over Museveni to curtail Uganda’s logistical and 
military support to the RPF culminated in various summit meetings in Tanzania in late October 
1990.  Habyarimana promised to initiate a dialogue with both the internal and external 
opposition under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to end the conflict 
and resolve problem of Tutsi refugees.  But this dialogue stalled, predicated, as it were, on 
Tanzania and Uganda persuading the RPF to essentially return to Uganda. Tanzania’s diplomatic 
intervention failed to stop the war because of Habyarimana’s unwillingness to concede the 
legitimacy of the RPF.  
Subsequently, Habyarimana prevailed on Mobutu to embark on a series of diplomatic 
initiatives to break the impasse.  Mobutu’s mediation starting on October 26, 1990 in Gbadolite, 
Zaire, proposed a cease-fire agreement to be supervised by a 15-man OAU Neutral Military 
Observer’s Group (NMOG) drawn from Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda.  Mobutu’s 
mediation created a negotiating process without altering fundamentally the government’s view of 
a cease-fire as a prelude to RPF’s withdrawal back to Uganda.  Even though Mobutu made 
overtures to the RPF during these talks, the government either refused to participate or sent 
representatives who had no negotiating mandate.  The government’s unyielding stance was 
demonstrated when it scuttled the deployment of OAU military observers, insisting on stationing 
a military team on the Rwanda-Uganda border to prevent further incursions by the RPF.   
With futile regional mediation efforts to stop the war, the focus shifted to finding a 
regional solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees.  The conference on Rwandese refugees 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in February 1991, brought together Rwanda’s neighbors, the OAU, 
and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).  Habyarimana promised to 
remove all obstacles impeding the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees.  In return, 
Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire agreed to naturalize and integrate refugees who opted to 
settle outside Rwanda.  With no end in sight for the war, Mobutu reinvigorated his efforts to find 
a durable cease-fire culminating in an agreement at N’sele, Zaire, on March 29, 1991 which 
proposed the immediate cessation of hostilities as a prelude to negotiations on power-sharing.  At 
N’sele, the Habyarimana government, for the first time, agreed on direct negotiations with the 
RPF.   
Further favoring the negotiations were fundamental changes in the domestic balance of 
power engendered by Habyarimana’s internal reforms.  These reforms created a new multiparty 
constitution and led to the formation of political parties sympathetic to the RPF’s position.  In a 
major breakthrough in April 1992, the major political parties signed a protocol that established a 
coalition transitional government. As part of this agreement, Habyarimana conceded to the start 
of negotiations with the RPF.3   
  
Phase Two, June 1992-August 1993: The Arusha Peace Process 
Tanzania, under the broad mandate of the OAU, mediated the Arusha peace talks from 
their inception in June 1992 to their conclusion in August 1993.  To provide additional sources 
of leverage, representatives from France, Germany, Belgium, the UN, and US attended the talks 
as observers.  Similarly, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and the OAU sent observers to give the talks an 
African imprimatur and demonstrate regional anxiety about a settlement. The multilateral nature 
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of the Arusha talks provided a wider international context of power, but in reality the essentially 
token participation of major Western countries and the UN from the outset helped shape 
expectations about the extent of international commitment to Rwanda’s peace process.  During 
the negotiations, these expectations weighed heavily on decisions about the resources for 
implementation, postwar economic reconstruction, and refugee resettlement. 
From the start of the negotiations, the Tanzanian mediators focused on reaching 
agreement on a durable cease-fire as a means to build confidence.  Previous attempts to establish 
cease-fire mechanisms in the N’sele agreement of March 1991 provided a blueprint for the 
negotiations, facilitating a quick agreement that established a 55-man OAU Neutral Military 
Organization Group (NMOG) composed of troops from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe.  
As the first multilateral military intervention in the conflict, the NMOG led by Nigeria’s General 
Ekundayo Opaleye, had the limited task to create and supervise a buffer zone in the north 
between RPF and government positions. 
With the cease-fire holding and the NMOG structures in place, the mediators steered the 
parties to power-sharing talks sequenced around protocols that addressed various facets of the 
conflict.  By early 1993, the parties had signed a number of protocols, including the rule of law 
and establishment of democratic rule, and power sharing during the transitional period.  The 
mediators faced a major challenge in February 1993 when Habyarimana threatened to 
withdrawal from the negotiations and unleashed his extremists on Tutsi and Hutu moderates.  
The threat to the negotiations was averted when the RPF broke the cease-fire and launched a 
large-scale offensive against government troops, doubling the territory under its control and 
advancing to a few miles of Kigali.  French authorities again saved Habyarimana from the RPF 
advance by sending more troops, bringing the number to at least 680, comprising four 
companies, including paratroopers.   
The confrontation in February 1993 was a turning point in the conflict, creating 
propitious circumstances for the mediators to prod the parties back to negotiations.  In a high-
level meeting in Dar es Salaam on March 7, 1993, the parties reconstituted the cease-fire and 
agreed on the mechanisms for the gradual withdrawal of French troops and their replacement 
with an international monitoring force.  As part of these efforts, Paris sought a UN force, 
culminating in UN Security Council resolution 812 on March 12, 1993 that authorized the 
formation of an international force “under the aegis of the OAU and the United Nations entrusted 
with the protection of, and humanitarian assistance to, civilian population and support the OAU 
force for the monitoring of the cease-fire.”  A UN reconnaissance team recommended that this 
mission, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), be deployed on the 
Uganda side of the border to prevent the supply and reinforcement of RPF.  
During the final phase of the negotiations between March and June 1993, both 
belligerents favored a strong but neutral force under UN leadership to implement the agreement. 
In a joint letter to the UN on June 14, 1993, the government and RPF suggested a rapid UN 
deployment after the signing of the agreement to “permit its speedy implementation and, in 
particular, the establishment of a broad-based transitional government thereby avoiding 
excessively long intervals, which might be detrimental to the peace process.”4  
The Arusha Peace Agreement incorporated six protocols signed by the parties over the 
twelve months of talks: the N’sele cease-fire agreement, the rule of law, power sharing, 
repatriation of refugees, integration of armed forces, and miscellaneous provisions.   Central to 
the transition was a multiparty Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA) that would be established thirty-seven days after the signing of the 
agreement.  Before their establishment, the Agreement allowed Habyarimana’s government to 
retain power on condition that it would neither usurp the mandate of the BBTG nor introduce 
new legislation.  The transitional institutions would supervise local, parliamentary, and 
presidential elections in 1995, twenty-two months after the establishment of the BBTG.  
  
C. UN INTERVENTIONS 
  
a) UNAMIR, August 1993-April 1994  
  
  
1. The principal circumstances that prompted third party intervention 
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) intervened to implement 
the Arusha Peace Agreement, an Agreement that had been carved out of a deeply polarized 
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society.  Most observers correctly saw Arusha as a political rather than a peace Agreement.5  
From the outset, the interveners confronted three major obstacles.  First, the Agreement was 
erected on a moderate multiethnic political center that attempted a power sharing mechanism 
against the overwhelming odds of entrenched Hutu power.  Second, compounding the 
Agreement’s internal fragility was an unstable regional environment that had a debilitating effect 
on the implementation process.  Third, both the mediators and parties to the Arusha Agreement 
staked its implementation almost exclusively on international actors who were unwilling and 
unprepared to expend resources on meeting most of its provisions.  
UNAMIR was deployed months after the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, but its 
clearly delineated phases reflected the parties’ responsibility to make tangible progress toward 
implementation.  For interveners, deployment was contingent on discernible movement toward 
peace and the establishment of transitional institutions.  For the parties, however, there would be 
limited progress in key provisions without full UNAMIR deployment. 
  
2. The nature of the intervention force 
In planning for UNAMIR, the interveners were assisted by the existence of a peacekeeping 
infrastructure, the OAU’s NMOG, which had been in place since June 1992 and UNOMUR, 
which was deployed on the Uganda side of the border and became fully operational in mid-
August 1993.  On August 19, 1993, the UN Secretary-General sent a reconnaissance mission to 
Rwanda led by General Romeo Dallaire, the Chief Military Observer for UNOMUR (and later 
UNAMIR’s Force Commander), to examine the functions of UNAMIR and evaluate the human 
and financial resources required to carry them out.  Dallaire’s mission recommended a much 
smaller force than envisaged in the Arusha Agreement and what some UN military experts 
thought was feasible for effective implementation. UN military experts proposed 8,000 or, at the 
very least, 5,000 troops.  In the end, there was agreement on 2,458 troops, of which 2,217 would 
be staff officers and troops, and 331 military observers.   
The reconnaissance mission recommended a four-stage progressive deployment.  Phase 
one provided for the deployment of an advance party of 25 military, 18 civilian personnel and 
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three civilian police after formal authorization by the Security Council.  This force would secure 
Kigali and establish the “essential condition needed to permit the secure installation of the 
transitional Government,” which, the mission acknowledged, “may not be installed until the end 
of 1993.”  Slated to take 90 days, this phase was also to lead to the integration of UNOMUR and 
NMOG in UNAMIR, concluding with a total military force of 1,428.     
Phase two, taking 90 days, was to focus primarily on disengagement, demobilization, and 
integration of the armed forces and gendarmerie.  The end of phase two would coincide with full 
deployment of the 2, 548 military personnel.  During phase three, which would last about nine 
months, UNAMIR was to complete the integration of the forces and reduce its staff to 
approximately 1,240 personnel.  In the final phase, lasting about four months, a reduced mission 
of approximately 930 military personnel would assist in securing the atmosphere required in the 
final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections.  Three weeks beyond the 37 
days (October 5, 1993), the UN Security Council passed resolution 872 endorsing the plan of the 
reconnaissance mission and established UNAMIR for an initial period of six months.  
UNAMIR’s authorizing resolution warned that its deployment beyond 90 days would be 
contingent on a determination that “substantive progress has been made toward the 
implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.”6 
When it was fully deployed, UNAMIR consisted of military forces and civilian observers 
from Bangladesh, Belgium, Ghana, and Tunisia.  In addition to Force Commander, General 
Dallaire (assisted by Ghana’s Brigadier Henry Kwami Anyindoho), Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), was the head of both the civilian 
component and the entire UNAMIR. 
There were frictions between the military and civilian components from the start of the 
intervention.  As the SRSG, Booh-Booh, was the overall head of UNAMIR, but the delay in 
establishing his office in Rwanda meant that General Dallaire led the mission for some time, a 
fact that was to create a gap in command between the civilians and military.  With the creation of 
the civilian administration, the military became subordinated to it; yet as General Anyindoho 
notes, the administrative support system was weak, incompetent, and uncooperative: “the 
majority of the personnel in the Administration and Management Division of the mission did not 
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appear to possess the requisite background to give them the necessary confidence for the day-to-
day handling of their responsibilities.”7[7]  Furthermore, civilian control of financial resources 
led to conflicts with the military.  According to Anyindoho:  “A force Commander who has been 
given troops to command in an operation must have a say in the financial control of that mission. 
Why will he not be given assets to control the force?  Flexibility, which is a principle of 
administration, seems to have been ignored in UNAMIR even though our first Chief of 
Administration happened to be a retired Colonel.”8  
  
3. Goals of the intervention 
  
Conflicting goals about deployment and intervention marked the enterprise from the 
outset.  The Arusha Agreement called on UNAMIR to “assist in the implementation of the Peace 
Agreement, more especially through the supervision of the implementation of the Protocol of 
Agreement on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two parties as well as the provision of all 
kinds of assistance to the competent authorities and organs.”9   The protocol envisaged that 
demobilization, disengagement, and integration of a new army would be completed between 
seven and nine months.  Under this plan, there would be a new integrated army of 19,000 men, 
divided on a 60-40 percent basis in favor of the government. The demobilization and gradual 
integration of the rest of the soldiers in civilian life was to start with the voluntary publication of 
lists of soldiers targeted for demobilization, the establishment of assembly points, monetary 
payments to individual soldiers, and the formation of a secretariat for rehabilitation and social 
integration.  Throughout this exercise, UNAMIR was to demarcate assembly points, including 
the establishment of an expanded Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), create the demobilization 
procedures to supervise the disengagement of forces, and train the new armed forces. 
The protocol also provided additional security roles for UNAMIR: guarantee the overall 
security of the country, especially verifying the maintenance of law and order; ensure the 
security of distribution of humanitarian aid in conjunction with relief operations, and with 
repatriation and resettlement programs; assist in the tracking of arms caches and neutralization of 
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armed gangs; aid in the recovery of all weapons in the hands of civilians; undertake mine 
clearance operations; and monitor the observance by the two parties of the modalities for the 
definite cessation of hostilities.  Article 64 of the protocol stipulated that the Neutral 
International Force shall be “informed of any incidents or violation and shall track down the 
perpetrators.”  In its initial role, UNAMIR was to provide security in Kigali, a task that would be 
linked to the formation of the BBTG and TNA. 
Dallaire’s reconnaissance mission, however, proposed a more modest mandate for 
UNAMIR.  Thus, instead of “overall security” in Rwanda, the mission suggested that UNAMIR 
“contribute to” security only in the city of Kigali: “Owing to the presence of several battalions of 
government forces in Kigali and the introduction into the city of the RPF leadership with a fully 
equipped RPF battalion, the Mission would establish a weapons-secure area in and around 
Kigali.”  Outside Kigali, while UNAMIR’s role in monitoring the cease-fire and demobilization 
of troops was to remain intact, the mission proposed a reduction of the assembly points, 
cantonment points, and integrated training centers from a total of 48, as suggested by the two 
parties, to 26.  With regard to maintaining civilian security through monitoring the activities of 
the gendarmerie and communal police, the mission changed the mandate to “investigate and 
report on incidents regarding the activities” of the police.  On the security components that 
provided for disarmament of militias and civilians, the mission, conscious of the difficulties 
caused elsewhere simply ignored them.  
These contrasting postures toward the goals of the intervention were captured in UN 
Secretary-General’s report following the reconnaissance mission: “The concern of all parties was 
that, should the neutral international force not be deployed in a timely manner, a political 
vacuum might occur if the transitional Government was not established in Kigali.  The mission 
responded by clarifying the decision-making process at the United Nations and by stressing that 
the dispatch of a peacekeeping force to Rwanda would depend on a final determination by the 
Security Council.”  
Members of the Security Council, wary of an open-ended intervention, opposed not just 
the provisions of the Arusha Agreement, but also the timing of deployment.  UNAMIR was 
created in a global context characterized by apprehensions about the wisdom of international 
peacekeeping.  Boutros-Ghali took the lead in presenting the Arusha Agreement as an 
“opportunity for the international community to contribute to the successful implementation of 
the peace process,” and constantly warned that delays would “seriously jeopardize” the 
agreement.  But in the Security Council, where it mattered most, Rwanda was not a high priority.  
Growing US apprehension about funding peacekeeping operations was heightened by the killing 
of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia, two days before Security Council debate on UNAMIR 
began.  Following the Somalia debacle, the Clinton administration came out with a new 
peacekeeping policy, termed Presidential Decision Directive 25, that stressed limiting the costs 
and risks of peacekeeping.10   
The first contingent of UNAMIR under General Dallaire arrived in Kigali at the end of 
October 1993, but it became fully operational at the end of December 1993 after the integration 
of NMOG into UNAMIR and the creation of a weapons-secure area in Kigali manned by 
Belgian and Bangladeshi troops.  With the deployment of nearly 1,300 peacekeepers, 400 
Belgian soldiers ushered the RPF civilian leaders and 600 soldiers into Kigali, the first move in 
the establishment of the BBTG.   
Lurking in the background of the deployment, however, were domestic and regional 
power realignments that were unfavorable to implementation of the Agreement.  Internally, 
extremist opponents of the Arusha Agreement organized by Habyarimana’s supporters and their 
militias redoubled their efforts to defeat the implementation of the Agreement at three levels.  
First, their main propaganda instrument, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLMC), began broadcasting in August 1993 by openly calling on the population to reject the 
Agreement and to prepare to fight against the installation of an RPF-dominated government.  
Second, the extremists increased the recruitment and training of militias in ostensibly “self-
defense” programs and expanded the arming of the presidential guard and gendarmes.  At the 
end of August 1993, amid the escalating levels of violence, Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, 
warned that growing insecurity did not “augur well for the implementation of the agreement 
because security is a prerequisite for successful implementation.”   In November and December, 
reports of escalating ethnic massacres conducted by armed Hutu militias throughout the country 
clouded the implementation climate.   
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At the regional level, the Rwandese peace process was dealt a severe blow by the military 
coup in Burundi on October 21, 1993 in which the elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, 
was assassinated and Tutsi-Hutu conflicts violence ensued.  Ndadaye’s death at the hands of the 
Tutsi military only helped to inflame ethnic passions in Rwanda, giving opponents of power 
sharing more ammunition that Tutsis were bent on dominating the two countries.  Most 
observers regard events in Burundi as the most important trigger to the unraveling of the 
Agreement, largely because it undercut the moral and organizational positions of Hutu political 
parties that previously had been the core of the consensus for negotiations and power sharing.      
 Stripped of the initial mandate of overall security, UNAMIR operated from the end of 
1993 not just on shoestring resources, but in a dangerous political vacuum that signatories of the 
Arusha Agreement had predicted.  In mid-December 1993, the SGSR, Booh-Booh, held talks 
with the RPF and the government in which both sides issued a joint declaration reaffirming their 
commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and the installation of transitional institutions by 
the end of the same month.  The Secretary-General’s December 1993 report to the Security 
Council noted that the cease-fire had generally been respected and recommended the early 
deployment of troops designated for phase two of the operation, thereby increasing UNAMIR to 
its peak strength of 2,548 military personnel. 
Attempts to constitute transitional institutions, however, stalemated in late December 
1993 as a result of severe disagreements over representation in the BBTG and TNA.  These 
disagreements stemmed from Habyarimana’s demands for the revision of some of the provisions 
of the Agreement that barred his supporters from representation in the transitional institutions.  
Although Booh-Booh crafted a temporary compromise that led to the installation of 
Habyarimana as the interim president on January 5, 1994, the deterioration of the security 
situation in the country worsened the implementation process.  UNAMIR had the mandate to 
contribute to the security of Kigali in collaboration with the local police, including enforcing the 
ban on weapons.  Yet, UNAMIR’s modest mandate could not meet the flagrant distribution of 
arms to militias and civilians by roving Hutu death squads responding to the RTLM’s call to 
exterminate Tutsis.  In January and February 1994 there was a multiplication of incidences of 
violent demonstrations, roadblocks, assassination of political leaders and murder of civilians.   In 
January, 1994, responding to a report from a close confidant of Habyarimana about plans by the 
Interahamwe to exterminate Tutsis in Kigali and the intensified stockpiling of arms, General 
Dallaire sought permission from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New 
York to use overwhelming military force.  The DPKO, however, informed General Dallaire that 
such action would go beyond the UNAMIR mandate that authorized him to contribute to the 
security of Kigali in collaboration with local authorities.  As violence escalated, the DPKO 
relented in early February 1994, authorizing the peacekeepers to assist Rwandese police, on a 
case-by-case basis, to recover illegal arms.  In spite of this action, UNAMIR’s capacity to seize 
weapons and provide security was hampered by the rules of engagement that required it to work 
with local police, which was allied to the Interahamwe.   
UNAMIR’s glaring impotence forced General Dallaire to send another cable to New 
York on February 1994 warning that the success of the peacekeeping operation would be in 
jeopardy without prompt confiscation of arms stockpiled by the militia.  He predicted “more 
frequent and more violent demonstrations, more grenade and armed attacks on ethnic and 
political groups, more assassinations and quite possibly outright attacks on the UN 
peacekeepers.”11  When General Dallaire requests for a robust mandate fell on deaf ears, Belgian 
authorities made pleas to the Security Council.  The US and the UK, however, vehemently 
opposed the enlargement of UNAMIR operation, citing the costs and risks of exceeding the 
original peacekeeping mandate.  In a letter to the Secretary-General on March 14, 1994, Belgian 
Foreign Minister, Willy Claes echoed General Dallaire’s concerns: 
 
Current political developments in the situation in Rwanda are not encouraging . . . As you 
are aware, the deadlock in the formation of a broad-based transitional government is 
leading, despite the efforts of your Special Representative, to a deterioration of the 
political climate. The Rwandese army appears increasingly annoyed by the parties’ 
procrastination, while information on the stockpiling of weapons by the various militias 
is becoming even more compelling.  Even some of the leaders admit that a prolongation 
of the current political deadlock could result in an irreversible explosion of violence  . . .  
It seems to me, however, that [the] higher profile of the United Nations on the political 
level should be accompanied by a firmer stance on the part of UNAMIR with respect to 
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security . . . Unless the negative development we are witnessing are halted, UNAMIR 
might find itself unable to continue effectively its basic mission of playing a major 
supporting role in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.12 
 
Frantic efforts by UNAMIR, Western ambassadors, and regional states failed to break the 
deadlock on the formation of a transitional government throughout the spring of 1994.  In 
February 1994, Booh-Booh issued a blunt warning that unless Rwanda’s feuding parties showed 
seriousness in implementing the Arusha Agreement the UN forces would be withdrawn: 
“Rwandese politicians ought to assume their responsibilities before the country sinks into 
insurmountable hardships. We have made lengthy consultations and efforts to solve the situation, 
but the UN’s patience is running out.  If war breaks out again, the UN mandate would be 
seriously compromised and we would have to pull out.”  With the impending expiration of the 
UNAMIR mandate at the end of March 1994, leaders of Rwandan human rights associations and 
NGOs pleaded to the Security Council “to maintain and reinforce” UNAMIR because its 
withdrawal “would be interpreted as abandoning the civilian population to the worst of 
calamities.”13  
The Secretary-General’s report at the end of March 1994 recommended the extension of 
UNAMIR’s mandate for additional six months with a new deadline and dire warning:  “In the 
event that the transitional institutions are not installed within the next two months and if, by that 
time, sufficient progress in the implementation of the next phase of the Agreement has also not 
been achieved, the Council should then review the situation, including the role of the United 
Nations.”  On April 5, 1994, the Security Council resolution 909 extended UNAMIR’s mandate 
until 29 July 1994.  The big problem remained lack of movement on domestic reconciliation, a 
task that regional states shouldered in a last minute effort to prevent what Tanzania’s President 
Ali Hassan Mwinyi called a “Bosnia on our doorstep.”  Summoned before his regional peers in 
Dar es Salaam to explain his consistent opposition to the formation of transitional institutions, 
Habyarimana promised to honor his word, but all progress was reversed when his plane was shot 
down on its return to Kigali.  Habyarimana’s death on April 6, 1994 began the genocide that 
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killed more than 800,000 people in ninety days, mostly Tutsis and moderate Hutus.  The 
genocide triggered the resumption of the civil war until the RPF troops restored order by taking 
Kigali in July 1994. 
International response to the unfolding genocide followed the pattern that had prevailed 
since the start of the implementation process.   Of critical significance was whether UNAMIR, 
under its constrained chapter VI mandate, would stay the course following the disintegration of 
civil authority.  Two days after the crisis started, General Dallaire sent a cable to UN 
headquarters about a “campaign of terror, well planned, organized, deliberate, orchestrated,” and 
directed against opposition leaders and “particular ethnic groups.”  He called for a revision of the 
mandate to counter the genocide, but, in secret and informal discussions that ensued in New 
York, the priority was how to pull out of Rwanda.  After the Interahamwe brutally killed ten 
Belgian peacekeepers, the security of foreign troops took precedence as Belgium withdrew its 
420 soldiers, and shortly thereafter, Bangladesh followed suit.  The Belgian withdrawal deprived 
UNAMIR of its best troops and strengthened international pressure for total withdrawal.    
Two weeks into the genocide, Boutros-Ghali presented three options to the Security 
Council on the position of UNAMIR.  The first option proposed the immediate and massive 
reinforcement of UNAMIR, changing its mandate and authority so that it could coerce the 
opposing forces into a cease-fire.  The second option called for the reduction of UNAMIR to 
about 270 personnel who would remain to “act as an intermediary between the two sides in an 
attempt to bring about a cease-fire.”  The third option was a complete withdrawal.  Boutros-
Ghali claims that he had a strong preference for forceful action since it would “give UNAMIR 
the credibility to deal effectively with the situation . . . I reminded the Council that the 
consequences of a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, in terms of human lives lost, could be very 
severe.”14   On April 21, the UN Council passed resolution 912 to withdraw the peacekeepers, 
leaving a token force of 270.  UNAMIR’s withdrawal gave extremist an opportunity to wage the 
genocide for two more months.  Although Boutros-Ghali described the withdrawal as a 
“scandal,” it merely ended a phase that had started with unrealistic expectations enshrined in the 
Arusha Agreement.  As General Dallaire has admitted: “The UN Mission, and those Rwandans it 
was intended to secure, fell victim to an inflated optimism to which I contributed, thereby 
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creating expectations that the UN did not have the capacity to fulfill.”15   
  
5. Scenarios for improving goal attainment 
Earlier or Later Intervention 
In the preliminary phase of the implementation, the gap between the parties’ inordinate 
optimism and the reality of international bureaucracy centered on the timing of establishing 
UNAMIR.  Conscious of the brittle nature of the settlement, the RPF and government had, in 
their joint letter to the Secretary-General in June 11, 1993, requested an accelerated UN 
deployment.  As a result, the Agreement set a 37-day timetable (that is, September 10, 1993) for 
establishing transitional institutions.  In setting the timetable, the parties received prior warning 
about possible delays, according to Boutros-Ghali: “At the time of the Arusha discussions, the 
United Nations made clear to the parties that the decision to deploy a United Nations force rested 
with the Security Council and that, if approved, the deployment could take up to three months. 
Given their serious concerns that any inordinate delay in establishing the transitional government 
might endanger the peace process, the parties had none the less decided to adopt the accelerated 
timetable.”16 The unrealistic timetable was compounded by the slow and staggered deployment, 
weakening the implementation process from the outset.  Furthermore, intramural UN debates on 
reducing UNAMIR’s meager forces on the ground considerably undercut the legitimacy of the 
intervention. 
  
Use of more of less powerful military intervention force 
Since the report of the reconnaissance mission recommended a reduction of troop levels 
to what most critics thought was a less credible intervention, the consensus has revolved around 
the lack of a “robust” mandate for UNAMIR in meeting the challenge of the extremist forces.  
Although the ability of the UNAMIR to deal with extremism with a Chapter VI mandate is often 
exaggerated in some of the revisionist accounts of the UNAMIR’s role, there is no doubt that 
dealing early with instances of militia violence would have made some differences.  At the 
decisive moment when the civil war resumed, Dallaire has claimed that given 5,000 troops and 
an enhanced UN mandate, he would have prevented most of the killings.  By April 6, 1994, 
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UNAMIR’s strength stood at 2, 539, but the number quickly dwindled to 1,705 after the 
withdrawal of Belgian and Bangladesh troops.  UN Security Council’s resolution of 912 of April 
21 further reduced this number to 270 men with a mandate to secure a cease-fire and assist in the 
resumption of humanitarian efforts.  As the Deputy Force Commander of UNAMIR remarks: “A 
force that was already under a weak mandate, poorly equipped and suffering from 
maladministration had had its final blow . . .We felt abandoned by those who established us and 
locked between the RGF and RPF protagonists who did not seem to appreciate our presence in 
their country, and yet both sides said again and again that they needed our presence.”17 
  
Use of a differently configured military force 
  
In addition to being lightly equipped and underfunded, UNAMIR comprised primarily of 
Third world military units with inadequate training, equipment and logistics.  Deputy Force 
Commander Anyindoho has pointed to these problems: “Right from the beginning of the 
mission, UNAMIR was best with logistics problems.  Apart from Belgium, all the contingents 
came from developing countries with a weak logistics base at home.  For example, the country 
that provided the bulk of the logistics support for the force had many problems with shipment 
and delivery of vehicles, engineer stores, and drugs for the force . . . Logistics, engineering and 
medical support should never have been provided by a typical Third World country.  It is my 
hope that such a mistake is never repeated in the formation of a new mission. The deficiencies in 
those areas reflected very badly on the force from the very beginning, and served to exacerbate 
the situation during the early days of the civil war and beyond.”18 Other revisionist accounts have 
suggested that the outcome in Rwanda could have been significantly altered with the deployment 
of well-trained, equipped, and commanded 5, 000 troops drawn primarily from a single 
country.19 In this scenario, the introduction of a large combat force could have stemmed the 
violence around the capital and prevented its escalation to the countryside. But in Rwanda, no 
such county was available. 
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Rules of Engagement 
UNAMIR’s Chapter VI rules of engagement were closely tied to the implementation of 
the Arusha Agreement: the use of force was limited to self-defense or after the authorization of 
higher echelons; if provoked, the soldiers were instructed to use non-aggressive and cooperative 
behavior and enlist the help of Rwandese gendamerie, UNAMIR’s designated local partner. 
General Dallaire redefined some of these rules, but these efforts were either inadequate or too 
late.  In the end, when the civil war resumed in April 1994, UNAMIR as a peacekeeping force 
had no peace to keep.  
  
6. Evaluating the outcomes of intervention 
Both the military and non-military components were insufficient to resolve the conflict. 
On the non-military side, as Anyindoho has shown: “It appeared everybody at the UN in New 
York looked at UNAMIR as one of the easiest missions that was going to accomplish its 
assigned role in twenty-two months, so a team was hurriedly assembled to administer it. Nothing 
could have been more militarily inept . . .For sometime, all successive administrators of 
UNAMIR were unfortunately non-effective.”20 On the military side, the hasty withdrawal at the 
height of the civil war undermined UNAMIR’s relevance and efficacy in the conflict. The failure 
of UNAMIR has been captured in the post-genocide consensus about the abandonment of 
Rwanda. The implacable hostility of key Western countries in the Security Council to strengthen 
UNAMIR’s mandate showed a clear absence of international commitment to the implementation 
process.  General Dallaire summed up the central problem of political will: “The United Nations 
wanted to send me more troops, but sovereign states made sovereign decisions not to do so.”21 
  
7. Exit strategy 
UNAMIR had a clear exit strategy staggered over twenty-two months and timed to 
coincide with the elections that would mark the end of the transitional period.   
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b) UNAMIR II, July 1994-March 1996 
  
1. The principal circumstances that prompted third party intervention 
UNAMIR II intervened in mid-May 1994 at the height of the genocide and the total 
collapse of order; large-scale massacres of civilians continued unabated throughout the country; 
and Kigali was effectively divided between the RPF and Rwandese government forces. With no 
adequate protection, as many as 3,000 civilians in Kigali had taken refuge in public places and 
religious sanctuaries.  There were an estimated 250,000 internally displaced persons in the north, 
65,000 in the east, and 1.2 million in the south and southwest.  In addition, 400,000 Rwandan 
refugees had fled to Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
  
2.  The Nature of Intervention Force 
With no Western country willing to commit troops to UNAMIR II, Boutros-Ghali 
recommended an expanded force made up of African troops with Western logistical and 
financial support.  The UN Security Council resolution 918 of May 17, 1994 agreed to a force of 
5,500 troops.  UNAMIR II became fully operational in November 1994 with troops from Ghana, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Tunisia, Malawi, and Zambia.  Apart from the African troops, Western 
nations such as Australia, Australia, the US, UK, and India provided medical, engineering, and 
communication experts to UNAMIR II.   
By the time of UNAMIR II, there was a large presence of international organizations and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in relief and humanitarian work.  Following a 
visit to Kigali by the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs at the end of April 1994, 
there was a decision to establish the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) that 
led the overall coordination of humanitarian relief efforts.  As a collaborative framework, 
UNREO drew from the resources and expertise of United Nations agencies, notably the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), the World Food 
Program (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO).  The UNREO strategic role was in 
developing basic operating procedures for the humanitarian assistance including the security of 
humanitarian personnel and the beneficiaries of relief assistance.   
The collaboration between UNAMIR II and the UNCHR broke down in September 1994 
over the alleged massacre of Hutus by the RPF.  Concerned about the paucity of human rights 
monitors in Rwanda, the UNHCR commissioned a report that concluded that 30,000 Hutus, 
many of them returning refugees had been killed by the RPF.  These charges reflected negatively 
on the protection role of UNAMIR II.  Although Boutros-Ghali diffused the internecine conflict 
by quashing the publication of the report, the image of UNAMIR II was dented by subsequent 
RPF attacks on refugee camps in January and April 1995. 
  
3. Goals of the intervention 
UNAMIR II was formed to undo the Security Council’s precipitous reduction of 
UNAMIR to 270.  Its formation was preceded by Boutros-Ghali’s campaign for the UN Security 
Council to take more forceful action to stop the massacres.  Similarly, the Force Commander 
General Dallaire recommended a force with deterrent capability, preferably a chapter VII 
mandate.  During informal discussions in the Security Council in early May 1994, however, 
there was considerable resistance from key members about “forceful action;” instead, consensus 
coalesced around a mission that would deliver humanitarian assistance and support the displaced 
persons.  Subsequently, the Security Council increased the force levels of UNAMIR II for roles 
that were largely humanitarian: it would contribute to the security and protection of displaced 
persons through the establishment of secure humanitarian areas, provide security and support for 
the distribution of humanitarian supplies and relief operations, and monitor border crossing 
points.   
The leadership of UNAMIR II also continued the frantic mediation between the interim 
government and the RPF to reach a cease-fire.  After the authorization of UNAMIR II, Boutros-
Ghali dispatched a high-level mission to Kigali from May 22 to 27 to support the cease-fire 
negotiations.  But by mid-July, having captured most of Rwanda and with the government’s 
forces in tatters, the RPF declared a unilateral cease-fire.  
  
4.  Scenarios for improving goal attainment 
Earlier or later intervention 
The deployment of UNAMIR II was a slow and painstaking task.  Fatigued by the 
proliferation of peacekeeping operations, the international community was less willing to provide 
the resources to support the deployment.  Moreover, even though African states did offer to 
participate in large numbers, they possessed neither the financial nor logistical resources.  At the 
end of July, UNAMIR II had less than 500 troops and 124 military observers on the ground.  In 
recognition of the delays in deployment, the UN Security Council accepted Boutros-Ghali’s 
extension of UNOMUR in June 1994 for an additional three months during which time it helped 
support the build-up of UNAMIR II and coordinated humanitarian assistance.  By October 1994, 
UNAMIR II troop strength stood at 4,270 and 320 military observers.  It was not until November 
25, 1994 that Boutros-Ghali reported that UNAMIR II had belatedly reached its authorized 
strength of 5,500.  At the same time, its mandate was extended to June 9, 1995 with further 
authorization to train Rwandese policemen and protect human rights officers for the genocide 
tribunal that was formed in November 1994.   
  
Use of a differently configured military force 
There was no alternative to the African peacekeepers constituting UNAMIR II.  Although 
resource and logistics problems delayed its deployment, the composition of UNAMIR II was 
adequate for its limited roles.  
  
Rules of Engagement  
Authorized under chapter VI mandate, the operation’s rules of engagement did not 
include enforcement action, but permitted a proactive role to protect civilians. The Security 
Council also introduced an expanded definition of “self-defense” in the authorizing resolution:  
UNAMIR II would be required to take action in self-defense against those who threatened 
protected sites and populations and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief. 
  
5.  Evaluating the outcomes of the intervention 
The military objectives of UNAMIR II were modest, geared primarily to salvaging the sagging 
image of the UN in the face of its inaction during the genocide.  Moreover, the African troops 
operating on shoestring budgets were not expected to make much difference to ending a war that 
was almost over.  When the full complement of troops and materiel arrived in Rwanda in 
October 1994, the RPF controlled virtually all Rwandese territory and the genocide had ended.  
The non-military aspects cannot be underestimated for their critical contribution to 
restoring an essential international presence and contributing to the coordination of humanitarian 
relief efforts.  Despite the delays in deployment, UNAMIR II achieved its basic mission of 
providing secure environment for humanitarian relief.  In collaboration with the French 
(discussed below), NGOs, and UNREO, it secured some refugee camps, helped the return of 
IDPs, and assisted the new RPF government in establishing authority in areas previously under 
government control.  Following the expiry of French intervention in August 1994, UNAMIR II 
assumed most of the security roles in northwestern and southwestern Rwanda.  In addition, 
UNAMIR II adjusted its operational plans to engage in the stabilization and monitoring the 
situation in all regions of Rwanda so as to encourage the return of refugees and IDPs; to provide 
security and support for humanitarian assistance; and to promote national reconciliation through 
mediation and negotiations.  In October 1994, UNAMIR II developed broadcasting facilities to 
provide Rwandese with factual information in the country, to assist in explaining the mission’s 
mandate and, disseminate information on humanitarian programs.  After the introduction of RPF 
troops in the HPZ, UNAMIR II conducted a number of joint operations with the government to 
secure the camps from bandits and armed criminals. 
The non-military functions of UNAMIR II enabled it to outgrow from its limited roles of 
supporting relief to those of reconstruction and rehabilitation of civil institutions and 
infrastructure.  Although UNAMIR II had neither the capacity nor the mandate to stabilize the 
economy, establish representative institutions, or reconstitute civil society, its presence 
contributed to the return of normalcy and provided confidence to some of the returning refugees 
and IDPs.  In addition, given the absence of working local institutions, UNAMIR II did lead to 
their reconstitution.   
  
6. Exit Strategy 
There was no clear exit strategy for UNAMIR II.   In an attempt to overcompensate for 
its previous flaws, UNAMIR II lapsed into an open-ended mandate to the detriment of relations 
with the RPF government.  By January 1995, its force strength of 5, 740 peacekeepers and 
military had exceeded the authorized level of 5,500.  From then on, the Security Council reduced 
its size within an overall policy of scaling down its peacekeeping components in preference for 
national and confidence building.  In June 1995, the Security Council resolution 997 extended 
the mandate of UNAMIR II ’s to December 1995, but stipulated the reduction of its strength to 
2,330 within three months and 1,800 within four months.  The new mandate reduced the security 
and protective functions of UNAMIR II, leaving it almost exclusively the humanitarian tasks of 
relief and rehabilitation.  The RPF’s discomfort with continued presence of UNAMIR II grew 
markedly amidst deepening mistrust between it and the UN in general.  In January 1995, the RPF 
described UNAMIR as “costly, useless, and undisciplined.”  As the RPF looked for bilateral 
military support to boost its security needs, it perceived UNAMIR II as an impediment; 
moreover, since humanitarian agencies were performing the humanitarian functions of UNAMIR 
II, the RPF saw the latter role as superfluous.  Boutros-Ghali, however, insisted on the presence 
of UNAMIR II to sustain the reconciliation process.  In the end, the two sides reached a 
compromise in which UNAMIR II withdrew in March 1996 to be replaced by a modest UN 
office in Kigali.  Security Council resolution 1050 of March 1996 created the United Nations 
Office in Rwanda (UNOR) to support the government’s efforts in national reconciliation, 
building the judicial system, facilitating the return of refugees, and rehabilitating socioeconomic 
infrastructure. 
  
D: OPERATION TURQUIOSE, JUNE-AUGUST 1994 
  
  
1. The principal circumstances that prompted third party intervention 
France’s Operation Turquoise launched on June 23, 1994 occurred in the context of two 
months of civil war.  But the war had increasingly become asymmetrical: with the capacity of the 
forces of the interim government crumbling, the RPF intensified its efforts to capture Kigali and 
seize areas on the Zairian border held by the retreating government forces.  The RPF advance led 
to massive movement of people from the combat areas toward the southwestern portion of the 
country.  Equally significant, the French intervened at a decisive moment when the deployment 
of UNAMIR II was stalemated in bureaucratic battles about funding and rules of engagement.  
By this time, the strength of UNAMIR had risen to 44 to 503, consisting of 354 troops, 25 
military personnel, and 124 military observers. 
  
2. The Nature the Intervention Force 
Operation Turquoise comprised of 2, 555 French, and 350 Senegalese troops under the 
command of General Jean-Claude Lafourcade. To lend it wider legitimacy, nationals of six 
Francophone states provided supportive services.  
  
3.  Goals of the intervention 
In seeking authorization from the Security Council, France defined Operation Turquoise 
as a humanitarian mission to secure and protect displaced persons and civilians, notably Tutsi 
and moderate Hutus, the main targets of government militias.  In its authorizing resolution 929 of 
June 22, 1994, the Security Council called for a “temporary operation under French control and 
command using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives of UNAMIR II.” 
There was no unanimity in the UN Security Council about Operation Turquoise, a fact 
that was captured in the description: “a reluctant decision of a divided council.”  In and out of 
Rwanda, the concern stemmed largely from France’s previous support for Habyarimana 
government and potential problems of coordinating the mission with UNAMIR II.  On the verge 
of gaining control of the country, the RPF was implacably opposed to French intervention, 
seeing it as a means to save the faltering regime.  To allay these fears, the Security Council 
specifically mandated cooperation between Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR II even though 
both were to retain their separate identities.   From the outset, therefore, the objectives of 
Operation Turquoise were inextricably linked to the broader humanitarian efforts of UNAMIR 
II. 
  
4.  Scenarios for improving goal attainment 
Within a day of UN Security Council authorization, French forces intervened from Zaire, 
with the speed and decisiveness that shamed UNAMIR II.  Operation Turquoise was established 
under a Chapter VII mandate, allowing the use force, but in the end, it encountered little 
opposition on the ground.     
  
5. Evaluating the outcomes of the intervention 
Operation Turquoise occurred at the height of RPF advance into southwestern Rwanda, 
with 1.2 million people from the northern and central regions beginning to move into Zaire and 
1.5 million to the southwest. The military capability and ease of entry enabled the French to set 
up a safe Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) in southwestern Rwanda, despite RPF opposition. 
Working closely with UNAMIR II, Operation Turquoise saved lives and halted the mass exodus 
of refugees into Zaire, as had happened in Goma to the north.  French intervention and presence 
stabilized the HPZ, where French soldiers resettled IDPs into refugee camps, provided security, 
and disarmed some of the militias among the refugees.  As the RPF gains led to more Hutu 
refugees into the HPZ, the French signaled their intention to use force to prevent RPF entry into 
the protected areas.  Overall, it is estimated that the intervention saved between 12-15,000, and 
prevented many more from streaming across the Zairian border.   UNAMIR II mediated between 
the RPF and French forces, allowing RPF representatives to visit the HPZ and reassure wary 
Hutus about the new government’s intention.  UNAMIR II also worked closely with Operation 
Turquoise to develop an operational plan that ensured the orderly transition of HPZ to UNAMIR 
II prior to the departure of the French forces in August 1994.22  
Operation Turquoise has been criticized for granting of refuge to Hutu perpetrators of 
genocide and facilitating their safe exit into Zaire with their arms intact.  In addition, French 
forces never made any effort to stop the inflammatory broadcasts by the defeated government 
from its security zones. These criticisms reflect the long-standing tensions between the RPF and 
France, but they diminish the extraordinary humanitarian efforts of saving lives and managing a 
difficult situation.  Moreover, the limited humanitarian engagement in the end disabused 
opponents of the intervention of the initial concerns that the French would provide military 
support for the faltering Hutu government.  Perhaps as a demonstration of the importance of 
Operation Turquoise, there were repeated international appeals for its extension to bolster 
UNAMIR II, but the French stuck to their deadline.   
  
6.  Exit Strategy 
The French were authorized to remain in Rwanda for a maximum of two months, with 
the option of leaving earlier if Boutros-Ghali decided that UNAMIR II had the capacity to 
replace French forces.  Operation Turquoise ended on August 22, 1994, two months after the 
intervention. 
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CONCLUSION 
The failures of international intervention in Rwanda have spawned a policy and academic 
industry.  What is often glossed over in all the excellent scenarios about how the world could 
have arrived at different outcomes is that the belligerents expected external actors to save them 
from a weak agreement.  The history of conflict and mistrust between the parties compelled them 
to seek stronger international superintendence in the less charitable post-Somalia international 
environment.  The failure was political rather than technical, stemming from an unwillingness to 
muster the resources to launch a credible peacekeeping effort.  UNAMIR II somewhat salvaged 
the tattered reputation of the UN, improvising in resources and mandate, making good of a bad 
situation.  Similarly, Operation Turquoise gave the French the opportunity to undo some of the 
consequences of their previous intervention in Rwanda.  
